

# DRAFT

*“Anima Mea Non Est Ego”*

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*Introduction* “Who or what am I?” My doctoral thesis director, Ralph McNerny, once visited a friend who was dying in the hospital. Her name was Jean Oesterle. Ralph was concerned that Jean was fading mentally; so when he entered the hospital room, he asked her, “Jean do you know who I am?” Mrs. Oesterle immediately shot back at Ralph, “why--- don’t YOU know who you are?” I hope that story is clear enough even for those of you for whom English is a second language, clear enough that you can see both the humor of it and the point of it. Ralph McNerny was the living human being standing in front of her speaking to her, as sure as Jean Oesterle was the living human being lying in the bed speaking back to Ralph with a particularly acerbic wit for which she was well known. Both are dead now, passed beyond the veil. But are they really dead? Perhaps they have survived their own deaths, that is survived the death of the living bodies they appeared in this life to be, survived as something other than a living body.

What I’d like to talk to you about today is a particular suggestion by some philosophers that Ralph and Mrs. Oesterle, and presumably all human beings survive their deaths as something other than living human animals; indeed, they do not in fact die if death means ceasing to live, as it seems that it does. What may surprise you is that these philosophers argue this claim against the background of contemporary Aristotelianism grounded in a particular interpretation of Thomas Aquinas. I think the discussion of this issue is important for bringing out certain very substantive and perhaps intractable

differences between what we might call the classical Aristotelian natural philosophy of substances and what we might call the contemporary metaphysics of material objects.

I will employ Aquinas' discussion of life, death, and the identity of the person as an example of *Classical Aristotelianism*. I will then refer to the recent discussion of Aquinas that attempts to place him in the context of the contemporary metaphysics of material objects. I will finish by indicating what I think is wrong with this recent account of Aquinas and point out how it displays what I think may be the intractable differences between Aristotelianism and contemporary metaphysics of material objects, particularly concerning human nature.

*Classical Aristotelianism* When asked, classical Aristotelians are likely to respond to the question, "what is a human being," that a human being is an individual living material substance within the species of animal defined as *rational animal*. Like any material substance, a human being will be a hylomorphic composition of a formal principle and a material principle. The Aristotelian account of material substance and its accidents arises out of the need to give an account of permanence amidst change—some material things remain the same while at the same changing over time in some respect. Aristotle's particular account of substance is introduced in order to account for what remains the same individual through a change, while accidents are appealed to as the modifications of substance that may or may not change while the individual substance remains the same. A substance stands under these accidents that inhere in it. A substance inheres in nothing, however, and so is said to subsist.

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The most radical kind of change involves the coming to be of a new substance, particularly a new living substance out of some pre-existing stuff that was not that substance; this new life is a unity of form and matter, the form being the actuality of the matter for the substance as the species specific kind of thing it actually is. But there are also changes of place for a living material substance as well as alteration of the accidents of the individual substance through processes of growth in species specific bodily dimensions of size or mass, the integration of nutrition, the pursuit of reproduction, and other suchlike processes and activities. Living material substances are developmental beings—as substances they come into being through a process of generation from a parent or parents of the same species, while eventually they cease to live and be through a process of corruption commonly called death. Death is a process of corruption and consists in the matter no longer being actualized by the form, and thus the individual living substance ceasing to be, that is, going out of existence.

When changes of place or developmental alterations occur as a result of the agency of the substance, they are the result of an inner principle of the substance called its nature, or in Greek its *physis*; this nature specifies the living material substance as *intending* by its agency an end or *telos*, acting and intending such an end even when the living material substance lacks intelligence. A human being differs from most such other living material substances by the fact that its acting and intending a *telos* through its nature is further characterized by its understanding of the end or ends it pursues, desiring those ends as understood, and pursuing those ends as understood and desired.

The formal principle of a material substance is called the substantial form. This formal principle of a living material substance, including a human substance, is the actual character of the substance as the kind of plant or animal that it is. The material principle is the condition for the sorts of changes it can bring about within itself or undergo throughout its life. In the case of living material substance, the substantial form is called the soul, the first principle of life in a body having life potentially, while the matter is called body, the material principle rendered actually human by the soul that is its actuality. So, in the case of a human being, like any living material substance, the substance can be called a hylomorphic composition of soul and body.

Unfortunately right here there is the possibility of an equivocation. When we say that matter is called body and that the human being is composed of soul and body, we are not using the term 'body' in the same way as we use the term when we say that a human being is a living body. In fact, the living body is composed of soul and body; there need be no confusion if we keep the two different senses in mind. I hope all of this is very familiar to those who are familiar with classical Aristotelianism.

The nature or *physis* is not simply an inner principle of movement. Living substances in pursuit of their ends act in generically common ways. But they also act in species specific ways that distinguish individuals as the kinds of living substances they are, oak trees, Labrador retrievers, and human beings, for example. So the nature or *physis* is also the principle of classification for the individual substance for which it is the nature. Considering the nature in that way, as principle of classification, it is called the quiddity or essence of a substance, because in specifying it we are specifying what it is for the substance to be or

exist, what Aquinas called its “*quod quid erat esse*,” and Aristotle τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι—literally, what it was for something to be. When we ask then what a human being is we have an apparently clear answer. A human being is an individual substance within the species rational animal. As an animal it is a living body, composed of soul and body. As rational, its animal activities are shaped or informed by understanding of the goods pursued in human life established by the teleological character of human life as opposed to different species specific teleological character of other forms of animal or vegetal life.

To see the importance of this classical Aristotelian position, it is useful to contrast it with what we could call the classical Platonist position. Oversimplifying greatly for the purposes of this talk, for the classical Platonist, a human individual like Socrates or Ralph McNerny or Jean Oesterle, is a soul. Were Socrates to ask, “what am I,” he would respond “I am a soul.” Were he to ask “who am I,” he would respond, “I am Socrates, that is, I am this soul.”

Notice the difference between the “what question” and the “who question.” “What” inquires into a classification. What class of beings does Socrates fall into? The Platonist responds that he falls into the class of beings that are souls. The “who” question inquires into an identity within that class of beings. Among all the souls there are, which one is Socrates identical to? Socrates is identical to this soul, rather than that soul that is Plato, for example, or that soul that is Xanthippe. The answer to the “what question” relates an individual to a class; the answer to the “who question” provides the identity of an individual. The demonstrative adjectives ‘this’ and ‘that’ pick out individual beings, individual souls

that are identical to the individual beings picked out by the proper names ‘Socrates’ or ‘Plato’ or ‘Xanthippe’, as the case may be.

So also do the indexical pronouns, ‘I’, ‘you’, and ‘he’ or ‘she’ or ‘it’ pick out such individual souls for the classical Platonist. Were Socrates to ask, “who am I,” as a classical Platonist his answer would be “I am this soul.” Were he to speak Latin, his answer would be, “*haec anima est ego.*”

By contrast, the classical Aristotelian when asked, “*what* are you,” will respond, “I am a human being, a living body that is a rational animal.” “I have a soul, and I have a body; but I *am* a living body.” Here, the Aristotelian is giving an answer to the classification question. Asked the identity question, “*who* are you,” the Aristotelian will respond employing the same referring pronouns and demonstratives as the classical Platonist; however according to the *Classical Aristotelian* those pronouns and demonstratives will pick out for identification a living material substance, a human animal. “I am this living body” as opposed to “that living body who is Plato,” or “that living body who is *Pythias.*” “I am identical to this living human body, not that living human body.”

Asked his thoughts on Socrates’ response to the “who are you question,” were he to respond in Latin, Aristotle would use the possessive adjective and respond, “*anima mea non est ego.*” Of course Aristotle would not mean that “I am not my soul, because I am Plato’s soul.” No. He is not his soul, because he is not a soul at all. *Who* I am is not my soul, because what I am is not a soul. As a living human animal, he *has* a soul, but he is not the soul that he *has*. He *has* a body, but he is not the body that he *has*. He is the living body in the substance sense that is the composite of his soul and his body in the matter sense.

In fact, if we take Aquinas to be an Aristotelian with respect to his account of human nature, these are precisely the positions that he takes on what a human being is and who a human being is. Representative discussions are to be found in the *Summa Theologiae*, the *Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Corinthians*, and the *Disputed Question on the Soul*. First, with respect to the classification question, *what* a human being is, Aquinas argues from the unity of human activity that a human being cannot be a soul. He does so in question 75.4 and throughout question 76 of the first part of the *Summa*. In 75.4 he explicitly asks whether a human being is a soul, and he answers no. First he argues that the definition of the human species involves both soul and body, body being understood here as “flesh and bones.” But definitions of species are predicated of the individuals that are within the species. The essence just is the nature of the individual, considered as principle of classification. The species essence is *what it is* for an individual of that kind *to be*, and thus is partly determinative of the identity of the individual in a way that accidents are not. Socrates, a man, is essentially soul and body.

Second, Aquinas argues from the fact that the operation of sensation, a human operation, does not belong to the soul alone as intellect does, but rather employs a bodily organ; however, since it is a human operation of a bodily organ, a human being cannot be simply a soul, but can only be a composite of soul and body. Finally, question 76 is devoted to arguing that the soul must be understood to be the substantial form of the living human being, the living human being who both understands without a corporeal organ and senses with a corporeal organ.

With respect to the “*who* question,” Aquinas uses Socrates as the example in question 75. Aquinas explains that while the species is defined in a general way as constituted by the composition of a soul with some flesh and bones, nonetheless, the individual substance Socrates is composed of this soul, this flesh, and these bones.<sup>1</sup> This point in Aquinas’ response will be especially important, since Aquinas explicitly says that while the species has a general essence, the individual Socrates has an individual essence consisting in this soul, this flesh, and these bones, explicitly arguing against the possibility that “this man [might be] this soul.” By specifying the actual composition of this soul with this flesh and bones as the individual essence of Socrates, Aquinas is making it quite clear that what it is for Socrates to be, his essence or quiddity, is for him to exist as this soul, this flesh, and these bones, in other words this living individual substance.

There can simply be no doubt about Aquinas’ position in answer to the *who* question; any doubts about it should be cast aside definitively by his commentary on *Paul’s Letter to the Corinthians* where Aquinas, discussing the resurrection, and explaining the natural desire of human beings for salvation, explicitly writes, “*anima autem cum sit pars corporis hominis, non est totus homo, et anima mea non est ego,*” that is, “the soul however is a part of the human body, is not the whole human being, and my soul is not I.”<sup>2</sup>

Now the human soul is often called a substance and a particular thing by Aquinas and other Aristotelians. The reason for claiming that it is a particular thing is that it has the operation of intellect that does not employ a bodily organ, where the souls of other plants and

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<sup>1</sup> 75.4 reading ratio for essence. Also SCG I.65.3 Also De ente et essential cap.1 CMDA VII.7.1435, 1469, 1490

<sup>2</sup> Aquinas, Super primam epistolam ad Corinthios lectura, xv, lect. 2, reply v. 19. Also Quodlibetum VII, q. 5.1, ad 3 where Aquinas says that the body is an essential part of a human being.



animals are not such as to be called this something. In earlier work, Aquinas often wrote of a human soul as a spiritual substance in its own right, and the question he typically asked was whether a spiritual substance could be the substantial form of a body. However, in his later works, particularly those composed at roughly the same time as commenting on Aristotle's *De anima*, while he continues to call soul a substance and a particular thing, he qualifies the application of the term 'substance' to it. The soul is not strictly speaking a substance. It is a particular thing, but a particular thing that does not have a complete nature. It is a particular thing like a foot or a hand are particular things, but not substances. They are rather parts of substances. Feet and hands are part of the flesh and bones that make up the body. Soul is a part of the substance as a principle of life for that substance.

Aquinas is explicit in the *Disputed Question on the Soul* that a soul is not a particular thing in the category of substance. To be a particular thing in the category of substance, the particular thing must have a complete nature, which a soul as a substantial form does not have. Instead, both soul and body are "reduced" to the category of substance as principles of substance.<sup>3</sup> What this means is that they are not beings in the category of substance, but they are both called substance in relation to the category because they are principles of it, rather than for example relation, or action and passion, or any of the other non-substantial categories; they are "*reducitur*," that is, led back to the category of substance in the sense of being referred to the category of substance rather than any other category, because they are principles of it.

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<sup>3</sup> QDA 1 respondeo and ad 13 and 2 ad 10 & 11.

Finally, it's important to see that in the sense in which the soul is called a substance, in that very same sense the body is called a substance; in that respect, soul is no more and no less substance than is body. Neither is in fact a substance. The general point is that the principles of a category are "reduced to," "led back to" the relevant category but are not members of that category.

So in conclusion to this summary of what we might call Thomistic classical Aristotelianism bearing upon human nature, a human being like Socrates is essentially a living body, composed of soul and body as its principles. No human being is a soul in terms of *what it is*, and no human being is a soul in terms of the individual that it is.

*Haec anima est Socrates* This classical Aristotelian account has come in for criticism by a number of contemporary metaphysicians, chief among them Eleonore Stump. Call the classical view "the corruptionist view" insofar as it holds that the individual human being who lived corrupts at death and no longer exists. For brevity's sake, I will focus upon Stump's criticism here. Stump in particular is repelled by the thought that individual human beings cease to exist upon death, rather than continue on as the souls that survive death. She calls the position both gobbledygook and heretical. I will focus upon the philosophical alternative she suggests.

Without question on the classical Aristotelian account, when a living material substance dies, it ceases to exist. The human animal is no exception to the general case of animals and plants—as living substances they cease to exist at death with the corruption of the union of substantial form and matter. Just as before his generation Socrates did not exist, so after his corruption in death, he no longer exists. Socrates, a living material substance is

identical to a living material body. It follows that when that living material body no longer exists, Socrates no longer exists.

Stump's objection is that at least as an account of Aquinas' Aristotelianism, this result. She gives a number of reasons for rejecting it as an account of Aquinas, some theological and some philosophical. I don't have time here to go into all the objections. Consider that a) Aquinas argues that the human soul continues to exist after death. So there is at least that respect in which human beings are an exception to the general case of animals and plants; their souls survive death where other animal and plant souls do not. That we can call the philosophical claim. But b) Aquinas also claims that the soul that continues to exist after death is subject to the punishment or beatitude that human beings in their bodily life merited by their sins or good acts. And c), finally, there are passages both in scripture and in Thomas' own words speaking of the blessed, the saints, as the individuals they were in their bodily life although prior to the resurrection, and thus calling souls by the names of human beings who lived as bodily substances. St. Peter for example.

Stump's claim is that the best way to understand all this is to say that Socrates exists after death. Death is not the end of the individual who dies. While the living body ceases to exist, the individual who was that living body does not cease to exist.

Now, Aquinas appears to comprehend the full weight of the implications for death on the classical Aristotelian view. We have already seen that he says "*anima mea non est ego.*" Aquinas does so in a discussion of the resurrection. In addition, responding to an objection that a human being must be a soul because we pray to the saints, like Peter, who are souls, Aquinas accepts the implication of the classical Aristotelian view that the soul of Peter is not

Peter, but explains that we pray to the soul under the name of Peter because of what Peter, the living human being, merited in life before death. In other words, the soul of Peter is related to Peter who no longer exists, but is not Peter.

Finally, Aquinas states in another text that the soul of Abraham is not sufficient for the existence of Abraham, again in a context in which he is concerned to reject Plato's view that a human being is or can be a soul. On this interpretation, far from undermining the classical Aristotelian view, these passages bolster it, for despite the extraordinary case of the human soul surviving death, it remains the case that the individual human being does not.

Stump is aware of all of these passages that seem to bolster the classical Aristotelian view precisely by bringing attention to how odd the situation of the human soul surviving death is. However, she argues that the classical Aristotelian view is mistaken because it does not recognize the metaphysical difference between identity and constitution that is so regularly made in contemporary metaphysics. Her claim is that when Aquinas writes, "*anima mea non est ego*," that is, "I am not my soul," he is denying an identity of myself and my soul, or an identity of Socrates and his soul. However, she continues that because identity is not constitution, Aquinas is not denying that Socrates is or may be constituted by his soul. In fact, we should understand Aquinas to be claiming that ordinarily and normally, Socrates is constituted by the composition of soul and body; however, after death he is no longer constituted by soul and body, but, rather by soul alone. Socrates survives death constituted by but not identical to a soul, the soul that had animated a body. We pray to Peter who is no constituted by a soul, and the soul of Abraham is in fact sufficient for the existence of Abraham, but not Abraham as constituted by a soul and body.

If you are not familiar with the contemporary discussion of constitution versus identity, this position of Stump's can look very confusing, even more so if you consider yourself a classical Aristotelian. So allow me to step back for a moment and consider the distinction drawn there between identity and constitution. More familiarly the discussion in contemporary philosophy is called the problem of material constitution. Consider a bronze statue of Achilles. In contemporary metaphysics it looks as though there might be two material objects occupying the same space. There is the lump of bronze out of which the statue is made—that's one object. Then there is the statue of Achilles that is made—that is one object.

Why think they are two objects? Because the lump of bronze out of which the statue is made and the statue have different properties. If we destroy the statue by melting it down, then manifestly the statue does not survive, but the lump of bronze does if we let it cool. If you accept that they are not identical, then it seems that you are committed to the view that two non-identical material objects can exist occupying the same space, which many take to be absurd.

However, the material constitutionalist says that there is no problem here if you distinguish the IS of identity from the IS of constitution. In the case of the IS of identity, there are two objects whenever one object has at least one property not held by the other.  $x$  and  $y$  are the same object if and only if  $x$  and  $y$  have all the same properties. If you individuate objects by the IS of identity, then you have a problem because it is manifestly clear that the statue of Achilles is not identical to the lump of bronze.

However, if you individuate objects by the IS of constitution, there may be no problem here.<sup>4</sup> When *x constitutes y*, we do not have distinct objects, even when *x* is not identical to *y*. It can be hard to describe just what a material object is on this view. But I will paraphrase my colleague Michael Rea's characterization. An individual object is a bunch of material stuff occupying a finite region of space. So *x* and *y* are the same material object if and only if *x* and *y* occupy the same finite region of space, rather than sharing all the same properties as in the case of the IS of identity. Consequently, with the IS of constitution in mind the lump of bronze and the statue of Achilles are one object, although they are not identical.<sup>5</sup> The lump of bronze constitutes but is not identical to the statue of Achilles.

With this distinction in hand, Stump argues that one can attribute to Aquinas the position that Socrates survives death as a soul, because when Aquinas writes "*anima mea non est ego*," he is employing the IS of identity not the IS of constitution. So the denial does not deny that Socrates or Aquinas or anyone else is constituted by a soul, just that each is identical to a soul. In addition, when Aquinas writes that Socrates is a composite of soul and body, this soul, this flesh, and these bones, on Stump's view his writing is ambiguous as between the IS of identity and the IS of constitution. Is Aquinas asserting that Socrates is identical to this soul, this flesh, and these bones or is Aquinas asserting that Aquinas is constituted from this soul, this flesh and these bones?

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<sup>4</sup> See Rea. Material Constitution.

<sup>5</sup> To avoid equivocation, one wants to avoid saying that they are one object according to constitution and two objects according to identity. Object in the case of constitution means material stuff occupying finite space. Object in the case of identity must mean something other than that to say that they are two non-identical objects occupying the same space. Likely it means referent in the Fregean sense. But then the whole discussion is problematic. Since the problem is generated by the Fregean sense and only solved by abandoning it while still thinking there is a problem to be solved, and introducing a sense of object that is otherwise unmotivated.

She argues that he has to be understood to be asserting the constitution position.

Why? Because Socrates can survive the loss of bits of flesh and bone; he has properties not had by this living composite of soul and body. He can lose his hand. He can lose his eye.

Apart from these organic integral parts, all of the bits of flesh or atoms that presently compose his body will be replaced over time with other bits of flesh and atoms. He is more like the Ship of Theseus here than the Statue of Achilles. Nonetheless, Socrates and this living body do not have all the same properties, and thus cannot be identical; one must constitute the other. Socrates remains Socrates in this life despite the loss and or replacement of all these parts because his soul remains the same as the formal actualization of the body. So in the midst of all these material changes, the soul is sufficient for the existence and identity of Socrates.

Stump's anti-corruptionist or survivalist position then is that 1) in this life Socrates is constituted from a living bodily substance, but not identical to it. 2) Socrates' soul is sufficient for the existence and identity of Socrates through change, although Socrates is not identical to that sufficient principle of his existence and identity. 3) Socrates continues to exist after death as his soul, despite the non-existence of the living body that once constituted Socrates. 4) However, even after death Socrates is not identical to the soul that survives. It is still the case that "*anima mea non est ego.*" Socrates is constituted by, although not identical to the soul that he survives as.

*Classical Response* In the time remaining, I can only respond very briefly to Stump's alternative survivalist position. In the first place, Stump argues that the existence of Socrates' soul is sufficient for the existence and identity of Socrates. Thus since Socrates'

soul exists after death, Socrates exists after death. However, the argument that Socrates soul is sufficient for the existence and identity of Socrates is fallacious. Stump attributes the “constitution is not identity” thesis to Aquinas by arguing that Aquinas holds that a living material substance can lose integral bodily parts, like hands, feet, and eyes while remaining the living material substance that it is. The identity of Socrates as a living material substance despite the loss of integral parts and indeed his identity over time in the midst of growth and replacement of integral parts is determined by his soul being the same soul through the changes. This situation appears to be a classic case of constitution.

However, Stump makes an argumentative move here that is unwarranted. I mentioned above the two different sense in which Aquinas uses ‘body’ and suggested the possibility of confusion and equivocation. There is the sense of body which is quantitative and consists of the various corporeal accidents a bodily substance may have. And then there is the bodily substance that has those corporeal accidents. Suppose we grant the attribution of the constitution thesis to Aquinas with respect to the first sense of body. After all, the living body in the substance sense continues to exist as a substance despite all sorts of bodily changes of quantitative and integral parts.

So we would be justified in saying that the living body in the substance sense is constituted by not identical to the sum of the array of bodily accidents that come and go. And we are justified in saying that the soul is sufficient for the existence and identity of the living body in the substance sense. What we are not justified in asserting without equivocation is that Socrates, the living body, is constituted by body and soul. But that is precisely the equivocal argumentative move that Stump makes—moving from body in the



sense of the sum total of accidental bodily features and integral parts to body in the substance sense.

In addition, it does not follow at all that if while Socrates' bodily features undergo change and Socrates' soul as informing a body is sufficient for the identity and existence of the living Socrates through such change, that then Socrates' soul *apart* from informing a body is sufficient for the existence and identity of Socrates. Stump had distinguished bodily parts like hands and feet from metaphysical parts like body and soul. She had then asserted that because Socrates' could lose any bodily part and survive, he could lose all bodily parts, that is, he could lose the "metaphysical part" that is the body and still survive. That assertion would not follow even if there were no equivocation in Stump's argument on the term 'body' as I've just argued. On its face the argument involves a quantifier shift fallacy. All that follows from the argument involving removing or changing various bodily accidents or parts is that Socrates' soul as substantial form informing a body is sufficient for the identity and existence of the living body that Socrates is. There is no justification in that argument for the claim that Socrates' soul is sufficient for the existence and identity of Socrates after death constituted by the soul alone.

In the Aristotelian analysis, Socrates soul as the substantial form of a body is sufficient for some living body to remain Socrates through processes of material change. If we then say that that living body constitutes Socrates and is not identical to Socrates, then we must but can only say that the soul informing that body is sufficient for the living body to continue to constitute Socrates through processes of material change. What does not follow at all is that the soul in the absence of a body is sufficient for the constitution of Socrates.

The Aristotelian claim was never that the soul as such is sufficient for the existence of Socrates. The claim was and is that the soul as actually informing some body is sufficient for the continued existence of the living body that is Socrates amidst change over time.

The second problem with the survivalist-constitution view that Stump has given is even more dire. It is difficult to know what constitution without identity even means when taken out of the context within which it arose and is analyzed, namely material constitution. Faced with the problem of the bronze and the statue of Achilles, the classical Aristotelian is likely to point out that there is no problem here. He does not begin metaphysics with the notion of an object. He begins with the notion of a substance that can bear accidents that inhere in it. The notion of substance he employs was developed in order to account for permanence through change. Substance is a *per se* unity; however, there are *per accidens* unities, the simplest cases of which consist in the unity of a substance with one of its accidents.

However, the question of identity is badly formed if asked to relate a *per se* unity to a *per accidens* unity—it is something like a category mistake. Of course a *per accidens* unity is not identical to a *per se* unity; it can't be. But that isn't because it is identical to something else. It's a badly formed question. In Aristotle's account of change and subsequent metaphysics developed from that account, *per accidens* unities are other than and dependent upon *per se* unities.

With respect to the statue of Achilles, the classical Aristotelian is going to say that the same *per se* unity, the bronze, substands the two different *per accidens* unities—the statue with its shape and the lump that exists after the statue has been destroyed. The two *per se*

unities are not identical, despite the fact that they have identically the same *per se* unity, the bronze.

However, the contemporary constitutionalist starts off in a different metaphysical place. She begins with the notion of an object defined as material stuff that occupies a limited region of space. Out of this notion of an object, she defines a relation of constitution distinct from the relation of identity. First she defines what it is to be the same object—*x* is the same object as *y* if and only if *x* and *y* occupy the same region of space. Then she defines what it is for a something to constitute something else that it is not identical with—*x* constitutes *y* if and only if *x* is the same object as *y* and *x* is not identical to *y*.

As classical Aristotelians we need not criticize this approach to metaphysics to understand why the application of the constitution relation to Socrates and his incorruptible soul after death is incoherent. The relation of constitution involves a notion of object that is inherently material. But the soul that survives death is not an object in the sense relevant to the notion of constitution that has been developed to solve the problem of material constitution. Stump simply appropriates the thesis that constitution is not identity in order to apply it to Socrates when he is a living human animal *and* Socrates' soul after the living human animal has died and no longer exists. What is actually claimed in contemporary metaphysics is that *material* constitution is not identity. But Stump provides no account of the intelligibility of the notion of constitution apart from material objects, no intelligible notion of constitution that could be applied to immaterial objects like the human soul.

Whatever one makes of the soul after death, it is not an object in the sense relevant to the discussion of material constitution and identity when it is asserted that constitution is not

identity.<sup>6</sup> So Stump is not justified in claiming that the soul after death constitutes Socrates while not being identical to Socrates.<sup>7</sup> As an interpretative matter, she is certainly entitled to agree with the classical Aristotelian that Aquinas denies that a human being like Socrates is identical to a soul; but she is not entitled to attribute to him a thesis about the constitution of immaterial things that has not been made sense of. At the end of the day, it is difficult not to conclude that the survivalist, suggesting that the soul is by constitution the human being after death, does not take seriously the reality of soul as substantial form of a living body with its unity and identity, a unity that corrupts and ceases to exist. I am neither identical to nor constituted by my soul. When Aquinas writes, "*anima mea non est ego,*" commenting on St. Paul, he is explicit that the continued existence of our souls provides us no hope for salvation without the resurrection of the body, since even if my soul is saved, I am not saved. I stand before you, living the life of a rational animal, hoping for the resurrection of the dead.

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<sup>6</sup> Even Rea and Brower, when they try to analyze the doctrine of the Trinity in terms of constitution have to make the extraordinary claim that the divine nature acts in some way like the matter of the persons who are like accidental forms modifying it.

<sup>7</sup> Stump and Brown insist that Socrates even after death remains a substance within the species of rational animal, even though there is no living animal that is either identical to him or even constitutes him!